

13 JUNE 1973

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
13 JUNE 1973

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FBIS TRENDS

13 JUNE 1973

CONTENTS

INDOCHINA

Le Duan Visit to PRC a "Complete Success," Yields New Aid . . .	1
PRG President Phat Addresses Biannual Council Meeting	8
U.S.-DRV Talks Ignored, PRG Proposals for Settlement Repeated .	10
Sihanouk Cites DRV-PRC Support; Moscow Reports Prince's Tour. .	11

USSR-JAPAN

Moscow Postpones Tanaka Visit, Toughens Line on Japan	13
---	----

USSR-LIBYA

LITERARY GAZETTE Assails al-Qadhdhafi for Anticommunism	16
---	----

EUROPE

Warsaw Army Paper Urges French Attendance at Vienna Talks . . .	18
---	----

USSR

Political Economists Resist Pressures for Reform.	20
Economists Resume Debate over Future of Kolkhoz System.	21
RED STAR's New Theoretical Series Takes Ideological Turn. . . .	22

CHINA

College Enrollment Underway, Schools Tighten Standards.	24
PRC Media Note Agricultural Problems, Urge Greater Efforts. . .	25

NOTES: Prague CEMA Session; Schlesinger Speech; Radio Free Europe Funding	27
--	----

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics	i
---	---

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

The 4-11 June visit of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong to China was "a complete success," according to the joint communique. The Chinese may have particular reason to be pleased by the timing and results of the visit shortly before Brezhnev's trip to the United States. Notable among the results was the signing of a new aid agreement and of a communique citing both sides' misgivings about Soviet-U.S. detente. The Chinese used the occasion to raise their commitment to the PRG as the "sole authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people.

After maintaining almost total silence on the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Paris talks, Hanoi media on 13 June carried the announcement that agreement had been reached on communiques to be signed by the United States and the DRV and by the four parties to the Vietnamese agreements, respectively.

Standard Vietnamese communist rhetoric regarding the peace agreement and long-range goals were reaffirmed by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat in his report to a recent Council of Ministers meeting. The Liberation Radio announcement on the 8th that Phat had chaired the Council meeting on 6-7 June in an unidentified "liberated area" supplied the first explanation of Phat's absence from ceremonies in Quang Tri on the 6 June PRG anniversary. Phat's report to the Council of Ministers called the PRG the sole authentic representative of South Vietnam. This description is consistent with the stress on the PRG's international prestige during the anniversary ceremonies in Quang Tri, marked by the attendance of newly named ambassadors to the PRG.

LE DUAN VISIT TO PRC A "COMPLETE SUCCESS," YIELDS NEW AID

Stealing a march on Brezhnev's visit to the United States later in the month, the Chinese hosted Hanoi's Le Duan and Pham Van Dong to a week-long summit visit beginning on the 4th that produced a new aid agreement and a communique which reflected a common attitude vis-a-vis the superpowers. With the two sides taking divergent approaches to the Vietnam question, the Chinese made a point of defining their new aid commitments in terms that made clear their interest in encouraging a peaceful situation. The DRV leaders returned home on the 11th after a

CONFIDENTIAL

13 JUNE 1973

- 2 -

few days in the northwest rounding out what was recorded in the joint communique as an "official friendly visit" crowned with "complete success."*

The visitors were accorded the standard treatment for high-level friends, including a meeting with Mao on the second day for what NCNA called "an extremely cordial and friendly conversation." In addition to the usual banquets, there was a rally on the 7th carried live over radio and television. Though Le Duan and Dong were given joint billing as leaders of the delegation, the party chief delivered all of the principal speeches. As the main host, Chou En-lai spoke at the welcoming and reciprocal banquets in Peking, but it was left to top military leader Yeh Chien-ying, who addressed the rally, to deliver the most comprehensive statement of Chinese policy. All of the active Peking-based Politburo members attended the rally, including Chiang Ching and the recently rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-ping.

SINO-VIETNAMESE According to the communique released on the
SOLIDARITY 12th, the two sides held talks on "the
 further strengthening" of their friendly
relations and cooperation, "the new situation" in Vietnam, and
other questions of common interest. A similar formulation in
the communique on Dong's November 1971 visit, without the
reference to a "new" situation, had included a reference to
"U.S. imperialist aggression." The two sides lavished the
expected praise on each other, with the communique saying the
talks "fully manifested the ever-deepening great friendship and
militant unity" and affirming that these relations, based on
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, "will not be
destroyed by any force on earth." The communique calls the new
aid agreement "a most vivid expression of the militant unity" of
the two sides, and Peking pledges its "unshakable determination
to continue to perform its internationalist duty" in aiding the
Vietnamese in their struggle to safeguard peace, build socialism
in the North, achieve independence and democracy in the South,
and proceed toward peaceful reunification.

* A 5 June meeting between the DRV ambassador in Moscow and Soviet Deputy Premier V.N. Novikov, who handles aid matters, raises the possibility that Soviet-DRV talks on aid may be in the offing. Minimal Soviet coverage of the Sino-Vietnamese summit included a TASS report on the delegation's return to Hanoi that singled out Le Duan's expression of gratitude for Soviet aid and his call for cohesion within the communist camp in his Peking speeches.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 3 -

The communique's assessment of the international situation reflects Peking's success in finding common ground with their allies concerning Moscow's detente policy. In passages clearly reflecting Chinese draftsmanship, the current document replaces a section in the November 1971 communique assailing "U.S. imperialism" with one calling for resistance by "small and medium-sized countries" and members of the Third World against the hegemony of unspecified "imperialists." In offsetting an acknowledgment of "some easing" of international tensions with a warning that the imperialists are resorting to "more cunning and deceptive means" toward their expansionist goals, the communique associates the North Vietnamese with Peking's characteristic expressions of concern over the effects of Soviet-Western detente. Yeh Chien-ying had forcefully pressed this line in his rally speech, but the more blatantly anti-Soviet overtones were muted in the joint communique.

AID ACCORD Both NCNA and VNA reported that an agreement on the PRC's "gratuitous economic and military assistance" to Vietnam in 1974 was signed on 8 June. NCNA's report of last year's signing of the annual agreement, on 26 November, had noted as usual that a specific protocol on the supply of "military equipment and materials" had been signed in addition to the aid pact, but none was mentioned this year. By signing the annual agreement now the two sides were able to produce a concrete result of the summit as well as to take into account the new situation in Vietnam after U.S. withdrawal.

VNA did not specify the purpose of the aid; but NCNA said that the purpose of the agreement "is, after the end of the war in Vietnam, to heal the wounds of war there, rehabilitate and develop its national economy and strengthen its national defense capability, and to further strengthen the militant friendship and unity" between the Chinese and Vietnamese. Prior to the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in April 1971, Peking had said that the aid was for the purpose of defeating the United States. But Peking did not indicate the purpose of the annual or supplementary aid grants in 1971 and 1972.

A 12 June NHAN DAN editorial hailing the "brilliant success" of the visit linked the aid agreement with the standard set of Vietnamese goals in the north and south, including "advancing toward peaceful national unification." A day earlier VNA released a message from the departing delegation to the Chinese noting "with

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 4 -

great satisfaction the resolve" of the PRG "to continue your support and assistance" in the new stage of the struggle until "our complete victory."

INDOCHINA SITUATION The two sides used the joint communique to put on record their positions on various aspects of an Indochina settlement, a task made difficult by the divergent approaches reflected in their speeches during the course of the visit. As in the November 1971 communique on Dong's visit, each side stated its views on the current Vietnam situation, with the Vietnamese charging the United States and Saigon with having "incessantly, systematically, and grossly" violated the Paris accord while the Chinese avoided accusing any party of wrongdoing. Where the November 1971 communique included a lengthy passage registering the two sides' "unanimous" views on a Vietnam settlement, the current document has them merely demanding that Saigon and the United States "thoroughly respect and strictly implement" all the provisions of the Paris accord. In naming Saigon first, the communique used the language preferred by Peking. On the other hand, DRV statements during the visit placed the main onus on the United States, consistently listing it first.

The Chinese did, however, make one notable move toward their Vietnamese allies' position by recognizing the PRG as "the only authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people. This represents a concession to the Vietnamese communists that the Chinese had persistently avoided in the past and serves to enhance Peking's political support for the PRG at a time when the latter is seeking to embellish its trappings as a legitimate government.* Peking also expressed support in the communique for the PRG's 25 April six-point proposal for a settlement in South Vietnam.

* It is noteworthy that Peking's comment marking the 6 June anniversary of the PRG's founding—including the usual leaders' message, PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, and high-level speech at a PRG reception—failed to echo Vietnamese references to the PRG as the only authentic representative of South Vietnam. The 12 June NHAN DAN editorial on the DRV delegation's visit made a point of citing the new Chinese formulation appearing in the communique.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 5 -

On Laos, the communique hails the Vientiane agreement, supports the "correct stand" of the Lao Patriotic Front, and expresses "the hope that progress will soon be achieved" in the ongoing consultations among the Lao parties. The two sides also hail "the huge victories" won by Sihanouk's front and acclaim his visit to Cambodia as "an event of great historic significance." Declaring that "the wanton bombing" of Cambodia by the United States cannot preserve "the traitorous Lon Nol clique," the communique expresses support for Sihanouk's five-point declaration and for the "just stand" taken by his front on a Cambodian settlement. Without elaboration, it calls for the Cambodian question to be settled by the Cambodian people themselves "free from foreign interference." During the delegation's visit Sihanouk's prime minister, Penn Nouth, had been prominently reported as present at various ceremonies, and he met with Le Duan and Dong on the 5th and feted them on the 6th.

SINO-VIETNAMESE The cracks in the show of solidarity staged
DIVERGENCES by the two sides were clearly evident in
 the course of the visit, reflecting their
divergent interests and priorities. As to be expected, these
differences derived essentially from Peking's moves in the
big-power arena and the consequent strains in the Peking-Hanoi
relationship.

+ United States: The repeated anti-U.S. attacks that punctuated the November 1971 communique are largely absent from the new joint document, but during the visit the Vietnamese indulged in outbursts against U.S. policy that contrasted with Peking's treatment of the United States. Thus, Le Duan in his rally speech on the 7th castigated the "extremely atrocious war of aggression waged by U.S. imperialism, the international gendarme," over the past decade and warned that Washington was attempting not only to impose neocolonialism in Vietnam but to oppose "the national liberation revolution and the socialist revolution."

Apart from Chou's brief reference to U.S. bombing in Cambodia in his banquet speech on the 4th, Chinese spokesmen avoided critical comment on current U.S. policy. In his wide-ranging rally speech elaborating Peking's line on global upheaval and conflict, Yeh Chien-ying justified Peking's diplomatic moves, implicitly including the developing relationship with Washington, by advocating the development of friendly relations with various countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 JUNE 1973

- 6 -

During the visit the Vietnamese offered several reminders of the Taiwan issue, but the Chinese avoided rising to the bait. As in November 1971, the Vietnamese side expressed support in the communique for liberation of Taiwan, but the Chinese this time, unlike the previous occasion, failed to acknowledge that support.

+ Indochina: Having impugned Washington's current motives in Vietnam in his opening speech on the 4th, Le Duan sharpened his point even further in his rally address by tracing "the deep root and the immediate cause" of violations of the Paris agreement to a U.S. "policy of neocolonialism in South Vietnam and of permanent partition of Vietnam." He harshly denounced Saigon as a "militarist and fascist clique," and for good measure he added a charge that the United States is "supporting the Lao rightists and conniving with them" in violating the Vientiane accord.

Reflecting Peking's more relaxed posture on implementation of the Vietnam agreement, the Chinese speakers failed to challenge U.S. intentions and were less harsh than their guests in criticizing Saigon. Citing the endorsement of the Vietnam agreement by the Paris international conference, Yeh stressed that thorough implementation is "a very serious matter," but he also observed that "historical experience and the facts after the ending of the war in Vietnam have shown that it is no easy task to turn an agreement into reality." In contrast to Peking's more detached view, Le Duan on the 4th insisted that Hanoi's goals, including reunification, are "closely interrelated objectives of paramount importance to be achieved at all costs, even through a hard and complex struggle."

The Chinese used their strongest language to warn against unspecified outside involvement in Indochina, with Chou asserting on the 4th that "no interference in Indochina under whatever pretext and in whatever form will be tolerated." Chou's warning, with overtones as least as much anti-Soviet as anti-U.S., was underscored by a remark by Mao to the guests, later repeated by Chou: "Vietnam belongs to the Vietnamese people, not to the reactionaries in Vietnam and still less to imperialism."

+ Communist Unity: Yeh's discourse on "imperialism and hegemonism" in his rally speech represented the most forceful statement of Peking's anti-Soviet line during the visit. Though the substance of his warning against Moscow's detente policy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 7 -

was reproduced in diluted form in the joint communique, Hanoi's concern not to offend the Soviets was reflected in VNA's censorship of Yeh's speech. While carrying the text of all the other major speeches during the visit, VNA reduced Yeh's discussion of the international situation to an innocuous brief paraphrase.

For their part, the North Vietnamese took the occasion of the visit to renew their appeals for international communist unity. In his opening speech on the 4th Le Duan offered a toast to "the tightening of the solidarity" among the communist countries, and he amplified this call in his rally speech. In a passage acknowledging aid not only from China but also from the Soviet Union and other countries, he pledged that the Vietnamese "will endeavor to do everything in our power to contribute in a worthy manner to the strengthening of the solidarity" among the fraternal countries.

The North Vietnamese have used these summit meetings to pursue their role as brokers for communist unity. This was particularly evident in the fall of 1969, after the opening of the Sino-Soviet border talks, when Dong's visits to Peking and Moscow were marked by invocations of the appeal in Ho's testament for restoration of communist unity. Le Duan had made a similar pitch during Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi in October 1971, as had Dong during his trip to Peking the following month.

In his rally speech Le Duan made a wistful historical reference that reflected Hanoi's concern over unity. He recalled that after the Chinese revolution Vietnam was linked with the PRC "and thereby with the whole socialist camp, thus adding new strength to us in our patriotic war." As a result, he said, "we won the great victory of the battle of Dien Bien Phu which is of historical significance." The historical implication might be that lack of unity in the communist camp makes a decisive new Dien Bien Phu less likely.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 JUNE 1973

- 8 -

PRG PRESIDENT PHAT ADDRESSES BIENNIAL COUNCIL MEETING

The timing of the PRG Council of Ministers meeting to coincide with the 6 June anniversary of the founding of the government follows the pattern set last year when, for the first time, sessions were held biennially in January and June.* There was no commemorative gathering held expressly to mark the PRG anniversary in 1972; the June Council meeting was said to have been held on the occasion of the anniversary, as is also the case this year despite the holding of the separate anniversary celebrations.

The locus of the Council meeting was, as usual, described only as being in a "liberated area." But it can be assumed that this area was not in Quang Tri, since Phat and other officials did not participate in the anniversary celebrations in that northernmost province of South Vietnam. Quang Tri has obvious geographic advantages as the site of anniversary ceremonies in view of the presence of envoys from the USSR, China, and other foreign countries. It is not clear why the Council meeting was not postponed until after the anniversary to allow President Phat to join other leaders in Quang Tri anniversary ceremonies and in welcoming arriving diplomats. However, the inability of other PRG officials to travel to the Quang Tri celebrations may have made the holding of another meeting at PRG administrative headquarters at the time of the anniversary unavoidable. Vietnamese communist media have not raised the question of a PRG capital, but the fact that lower-level foreign diplomatic officers as well as ambassadors were in Quang Tri suggests that facilities for a permanent diplomatic presence will be established somewhere in the South.

POLITICAL REPORT Unlike the five previous Council of Ministers meetings, the 6 June session did not release a communique. As usual, Phat delivered the major political report; following the precedent set last January, it and the military report were made public, while the substance of other reports was not revealed. Covering predictable ground, Phat's report lauded the history of the Vietnamese struggle and the "victory" of the Paris agreement and expounded on the "role, prestige, and authority" of the PRG as "the sole genuine representative" of the South Vietnamese people.

* PRG Council of Ministers meeting since the government was established in 1969 are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 January 1973, 14 June and 2 February 1972, 24 February 1971, and 4 February 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 9 -

Phat's major points were generally identical to those made by Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho in his 5 June speech at the PRG anniversary meeting in Quang Tri. After calling the United States the "main cause" of continuing problems in South Vietnam and Indochina and reaffirming long-standing goals, Phat issued the cryptic warning that "our patience has its limits." He added that Saigon military operations would be "punished" and that "no brutal force, no pressure, no perfidious maneuvers can make the South Vietnamese people depart from their just path of struggle and their lofty goals." While professing the usual determination and optimism regarding eventual complete victory, Phat also voiced the standard word of caution about difficulties to be overcome. Stressing the importance of unity with other elements in South Vietnam, he reaffirmed the view stressed at the January Council meeting that "national concord is the fundamental and foremost policy" of the NFLSV and PRG.

Both Phat and Tho appealed for foreign assistance--communist as well as noncommunist--for the South Vietnamese people and the PRG to heal the wounds of war and rebuild the country. The question of postwar reconstruction aid has rarely been raised in PRG media, although Tho, in an interview carried by LPA on 3 June, noted that the NFLSV and PRG "encourage Vietnamese overseas to invest their capital in order to rebuild the country, and foreigners to invest capital and techniques to contribute to the restoration and building of the economy in South Vietnam" The question of U.S. aid to South Vietnam was touched on in a 12 April Liberation Radio report on a meeting two days earlier between U.S. Senator Brooke and Hoang Anh Tuan--then deputy head of the PRG delegation to the JMC. Tuan expressed the view that the question of U.S. aid must be brought up with the government formed after general elections and that "in the absence of such a government, U.S. contributions must be channeled through the two present administrations in the South--the PRG and the Saigon administration."

MILITARY REPORT The report to the Council on military matters claimed that the PRG has exercised self-restraint and set forth reasonable proposals for a cease-fire and the achievement of national concord, and it added--echoing the warnings by Tho and Phat--that "this good will is also limited." The report was given by Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, who was said to represent the PLAF Command and to be authorized by the PRG Defense Ministry.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
13 JUNE 1973

- 10 -

This is the first time Tra has assumed the role of spokesman on the South Vietnamese military situation; he has not been identified in a new position since he was replaced on 12 May, by Hoang Anh Tuan, as head of the PRG delegation to the Joint Military Commission (JMC). At the January Council meeting the military report was similarly read by a representative of the PLAF Command and Defense Ministry, one Le Chan, rather than by the more logical spokesman--Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung.

U.S.-DRV TALKS IGNORED, PRG PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT REPEATED

Although Hanoi media had announced the 6 June resumption of the talks in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho which had begun in May, they failed to mention the talks again recessed on 9 June and resumed on the 12th. Consistent with this silence, Vietnamese communist reports of PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's 6 June press conference in Quang Tri ignored her remarks on the Paris meetings. The French CP organ L'HUMANITE reported on the 9th that Binh had "emphasized" that the talks took place at Kissinger's request. She also reportedly expressed approval of the meetings but warned that the struggle to implement the Paris agreement will require "much patience and energy" even if world opinion and "domestic difficulties such as the Watergate affair" cause the United States to reaffirm the validity of the agreement and accept its own and Saigon's responsibility for implementing it.*

Issues that were presumably on the agenda of the U.S.-DRV talks in Paris, however, have been given publicity in Vietnamese communist media in the course of their efforts to press the PRG's six-point proposal advanced on 25 April. Nguyen Huu Tho in his 5 June PRG anniversary speech, for example, reaffirmed the PRG's adherence to the six points and specifically demanded an end to the fighting, the release of all civilian prisoners, a guarantee of democratic liberties, and the establishment of the

* Hanoi media have continued to carry accounts of Western press reports on Watergate developments but have generally avoided comment. For example, the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 15 through 30 May carried a 15-part series on Watergate from Western news reports, with only the final installment offering the independent comment that President Nixon is supported by "powerful capitalists" who will not let him be "overthrown."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 11 -

National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. His omission of the final two points--on general elections and the reduction of armed forces--reflected the communists' consistent position that these questions can only be settled after full implementation of the first four points.*

A 13 June NHAN DAN article, which repeated the standard claim that the Thieu regime is seeking a military victory rather than a settlement under the Paris agreement, denounced Saigon allegations that communist forces are preparing to launch a new military offensive designated "operation elephant tail and mouse head." Judging from the brief VNA summary, however, NHAN DAN did not acknowledge reports that such an operation might begin if the communists fail to achieve their aims in the Paris talks.

SIHANOUK CITES DRV. PRC SUPPORT; MOSCOW REPORTS PRINCE'S TOUR

Prince Sihanouk and his front seem to have assumed a more relaxed posture after earlier having given vent to strident outbursts against a "Munich-style conference" in which outside powers would exert pressure for a compromise settlement in Cambodia. The stream of attacks on a cease-fire agreement issued by Sihanouk on his foreign tour and by the resistance leaders have trickled to an infrequent statement on the settlement issue. This change coincides with the Sino-Vietnamese summit in Peking and may reflect assurances to the FUNK that its allies are not seeking a deal at the expense of its objectives of overthrowing the Lon Nol regime.

In a speech in Tirana on 8 June, Sihanouk derided Washington for declaring that the United States and the DRV "will soon end the armed resistance of the Khmer people" and enable the Phnom Penh "treacherous clique" to survive indefinitely. Asserting that this "shameless political maneuver" has been exposed by the DRV leaders themselves, he disclosed that Le Duan and Pham Van Dong had assured his prime minister, Penn Nouth, in Peking on the 5th that the DRV would never discuss the Cambodian question in place of the FUNK and that the United States should talk directly with Sihanouk's government. Later in the speech Sihanouk quoted Chou En-lai's 4 June warning that no outside interference in Indochina will be tolerated as well as Chou's endorsement of Sihanouk's five-point declaration.

* The six-point proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 May 1973, pages 11-13.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 12 -

in reporting the DRV leaders' meeting with Penn Nouth, Hanoi media supplied no substance of the conversation. But a 9 June NHAN DAN article repeated earlier denials that a Cambodian settlement was being negotiated between the DRV and the United States.

MOSCOW The Soviets have further complicated the murky Cambodian story by beginning to report for the first time on Sihanouk's foreign tour. Soviet references to Sihanouk since his overthrow and exile in Peking have been rare, and he had not been mentioned in monitored Soviet media since before the signing of the Vietnam agreement. However, brief TASS reports on the 8th and 10th noted his stays in Algeria and Yugoslavia. The reports maintained Moscow's avoidance of references to Sihanouk's government, but TASS quoted him as saying to Tito that Cambodia needs the support of other countries and recognition of the FUNK. As to be expected, Moscow did not report his visit to Albania, where he pointedly thanked "our beloved Albanian brothers" for their support "while some allegedly anti-imperialist countries, and indeed not unimportant, feign not to understand us."

Moscow's decision to report on Sihanouk's travels and his appeal for support suggests that the Soviets may find it opportune to cultivate the FUNK at this time. A Soviet commentary on the 7th raised the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Cambodia in observing that "there are objective conditions for restoring peace and settling the military conflict by political means," which would conform with "the basic national interests of the Cambodians." The commentary noted vaguely that there are unspecified "healthy forces" in Cambodia "capable of carrying out the will of the people and of keeping agreements on the basis of respect for their legitimate rights and aspirations."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 13 -

USSR - JAPAN

MOSCOW POSTPONES TANAKA VISIT, TOUGHENS LINE ON JAPAN

An unusually candid article on Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation published in LITERARY GAZETTE on 6 June--the same day the Soviet Union informed Foreign Minister Ohira that Prime Minister Tanaka's projected visit to Moscow in August* would be "inconvenient" at that time--suggests that Moscow is using the summit as a lever to pry out better terms for Soviet-Japanese economic and technical cooperation as well as to increase its bargaining position on the sensitive territorial question which still inhibits Soviet-Japanese relations. The article reveals that some hardening on the terms for trade and closer economic ties with Japan may be in the offing in the wake of Brezhnev's recent meeting with Chancellor Brandt in Bonn which opened the prospect of USSR-FRG agreements on economic and technical exchanges and as Moscow reevaluates Japanese-Chinese relations.

FOCUS ON CREDITS Departing from the tone of previous Soviet comment on joint economic cooperation with Japan, the lengthy article, jointly written by D. Petrov and V. Syrkomskiy, played down the specter of Japan as an industrial giant by placing heavy stress on Japan's reliance on raw materials for its survival. After noting that "there are almost no minerals in Japan," the article argued that "the tremendous interest which Japan is displaying in the possibility of acquiring raw materials from the boundless resources of Siberia is understandable." Sharpening the image of the USSR as a potential economic partner in meeting Japan's "acute" need for raw materials, the article became unusually specific in outlining the terms of future Soviet-Japan economic cooperation:

Our position is perfectly clear. We say: You need raw material? By all means, we are ready to accelerate the development of the appropriate deposits to satisfy your requirements. Give us credits and we will buy equipment and mechanisms from you and pay for them in raw materials.

* The Soviet Ambassador to Japan asked on the 6th that Tanaka's trip be postponed to some time between mid-September and mid-October. KYODO on 9 June reported Tanaka's announcement that he would visit the USSR after 20 September. At this writing, Moscow media have not yet confirmed a September meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 14 -

After highlighting statements by several Japanese businessmen favoring government support for "large bank credits" to the Soviet Union as a means of overcoming Japan's "energy crisis," the article linked future economic cooperation between Moscow and Tokyo to still unresolved political problems. "It would be wrong to turn a blind eye," the article cautioned, "to the fact that there are also forces in present-day Japan which are trying to put obstacles in the path of the development of good-neighborly relations. Ultraright elements, for example, are still dragging out the so-called territorial question." In keeping with the shift in Moscow's line on the status of the four northern islands which dates back to Brezhnev's letter to Tanaka last March, the article avoided claiming that the territorial issue was "settled." It did, nevertheless, firmly argue that "the highway leading to the establishment of relations of true good-neighborliness and friendship consists not of creating artificial barriers under false pretexts but of seeking mutually acceptable resolutions."

THE CHINESE DIMENSION Bringing in the Chinese factor, Petrov and Syrkomskiy then pointed to the recently concluded month-long visit to Japan of a Chinese delegation led by Liao Cheng-chih, head of the China-Japan Friendship Association, as evidence that "the Maoist leadership is trying to use Chinese-Japanese contacts to hinder the development of good-neighborly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union." Liao's delegation was specifically charged with having made "slandorous attacks on the Soviet Union" in trying to "persuade Japanese business circles not to embark on broad economic cooperation with our country, threatening to regard it as an 'unfriendly act' against China." Displaying an unusual degree of confidence regarding the still budding relationship between Peking and Tokyo, however, the article introduced a new theme in Moscow's line on the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. It argued that "the initial boom linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations last fall has clearly slumped." Developing this argument, the article claimed that "the representatives of business circles and political leaders who put all their money on China are proving to be in an increasingly embarrassing position." As illustration, the article cited recent Japanese press reports that Chinese toy pandas--a "fashionable symbol" of the establishment of relations with China several months ago--are now "piled up on the toy counters" in Japanese stores looking "sadly at the indifferent passersby as though they knew that the man who invested all his capital in the manufacture of pandas, committed suicide when the dust began to settle on thousands of the toys in storehouses."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 15 -

Linking this specter of public disenchantment with Peking to Tanaka's forthcoming visit to Moscow, Petrov and Syrkomskiy pointed to an unidentified article in the JAPAN TIMES as having contained "a warning for those who have not lost hope of using relations between the USSR and the PRC as the subjects of a shady diplomatic game" and for having pointed out that one of the tasks of Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Moscow must be the "liquidation of any suspicion whatever regarding Japan's intention to make a deal with Peking against the interests of the Soviet Union." The JAPAN TIMES article was also said to have called for a statement that Japan not only "has not the slightest desire to be dragged into disputes between the USSR and China," but that it is also "not in any way interested in using in any form contradictions between them in its own interests."

As if to underscore the significance of Brezhnev's recent trip to Bonn and the possible emergence of West Germany as an economic rival of Japan in trade with Moscow, Petrov and Syrkomskiy reported that the JAPAN TIMES had noted that this "unprecedented meeting" signals "colossal progress" in relations between the two countries as well as "the start of a new era" in Europe. Turning to "Tanaka's decision to visit Moscow this year," Petrov and Syrkomskiy advised the prime minister that keeping abreast of the "swiftly developing process of the relaxation of international tension is increasingly determining the position of the leading politicians in Japan."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

-- 16 --

USSR - LIBYA

LITERARY GAZETTE ASSAILS AL-QADHDHAFI FOR ANTICOMMUNISM

Moscow's irritation with Libyan President al-Qadhdhafi has been displayed most recently in a LITERARY GAZETTE article of 6 June which took issue with his "wild assertions" about communism. Soviet-Libyan press friction erupted over a year ago when PRAVDA in March 1972 objected to an "overtly provocative article" in the Libyan army paper which coincided with the official visit to Moscow of a Libyan Government delegation headed by then Economy Minister Jallud. Since then Moscow has periodically responded to Libyan positions: NEW TIMES last September "regretted" al-Qadhdhafi's Maoist-oriented phraseology and found Libya "in particular need of accurate orientation"; LITERARY GAZETTE in October deplored a Libyan press article "blaspheming" an-Nasir and in November assailed a Libyan paper for its "dubious role as 'exposer of communism.'" And this January LITERARY GAZETTE dismissed as "fanciful imagination" assertions by al-Qadhdhafi that the USSR had twice requested air and naval bases in Libya.

Now Borisov, in the 6 June LITERARY GAZETTE, further demonstrated Soviet sensitivity to al-Qadhdhafi's "accusations against communism" as rejecting nationalism, advocating atheism, and other "absurd ideas." In his article--broadcast in installments in Moscow's Arabic service--Borisov derided the Libyan leader's "third theory" concept of an alternative to capitalism and communism and scoffed at his new ideology of "true socialism" based on justice and Islam. While he made no mention of the Egyptian-Libyan merger scheduled for September, Borisov pointedly contrasted al-Qadhdhafi's "anticommunism and anti-Sovietism" with the Egyptian "official" position and quoted an-Nasir and as-Sadat on the merits of Soviet-Arab friendship.

Borisov also ignored al-Qadhdhafi's "popular revolution," launched in a 15 April speech and brushed off by Moscow in a domestic service broadcast five days later which had tersely noted that the first steps included "mass arrests of Libyan Communist Party members." A week later, NEW TIMES had observed that while reports were confusing, "the aim appears to be 'revolutionization' of Libya" on the basis of Islam.*

* The Czechoslovak CTK in a Tripoli-dated report on 11 June remarked that Libya's cultural revolution was aimed not against foreign oil companies but against "progressive forces in the country under dogmatic slogans" of Islam and nationalism, and added that Egypt "is not expected to approve such a policy after the planned merger."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 17 -

Taking another swipe at al-Qadhdhafi's "anticommunism," a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 11 June pegged to the anniversary of the evacuation of Wheelus base lectured on the importance of the USSR's great support and aid to the Arab countries and recalled that the Soviet stand was "appropriately appreciated" in the joint communique on Jallud's March 1972 visit to Moscow. Against this background, the commentary found it "extremely odd, to say the least," that voices were being raised in Libya trying to cast doubts on Soviet policy.

In a further display of pique, Moscow all but ignored al-Qadhdhafi's anniversary speech on the 11th: In two one-sentence dispatches from Tripoli, TASS that day attributed to the Libyan Revolution Command Council the decisions to recognize the GDR and to nationalize the American oil company Bunker Hunt. Reporting the former decision, TASS noted that it had been announced by al-Qadhdhafi, "who spoke here." TASS did add the next day that in his anniversary speech al-Qadhdhafi explained the decision on Bunker Hunt as motivated by the United States' "all-out support" for Israel.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 18 -

EUROPE

WARSAW ARMY PAPER URGES FRENCH ATTENDANCE AT VIENNA TALKS

Broaching a subject rarely discussed in Soviet bloc media, the Polish army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 5 June provided a generally favorable review of French positions on MBFR, suggesting that eventual French participation could be anticipated on the basis of France's expressed interests. Picking and choosing among French statements to support this interpretation, the Polish paper highlighted arguments that seemed to suggest a parallel between French and Soviet bloc positions. In this context it revealed some insights into Soviet bloc attitudes, mainly a strong Polish interest in seeing France join the talks. It also aired an idea on force reductions that has not previously been advanced in Soviet bloc media--the idea of substituting offsetting for parallel force reductions, which would have the effect of maintaining a balance between the offensive and defensive forces of the opposing sides while overall force levels were being reduced.

The argument advanced by ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI is consistent both with the general Soviet position that the talks should be open to "other European states" and with Soviet statements on France in particular. Moscow media discussed the possibility of a French role in MBFR in mid-January following the Pompidou-Brezhnev talks in Minsk. Writing about the talks in SOVIET RUSSIA on the 18th, TASS Director General Zamyatin took approving note of evidence suggesting that Pompidou was receptive to Brezhnev's "appeal" for French participation. Moscow has been reticent, however, about discussing French positions in detail and about offering advice to the French as to what their policy toward the talks should be.

ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI showed no such reticence. It went into considerable detail in discussing French arguments against MBFR, suggesting that Poland shared French attitudes to some extent. It made this particularly clear with respect to the impact of force reductions on the military balance in West Europe. Noting with approval French concerns on this score, it observed that only West Germany was in a position to profit from the withdrawal of American troops from the continent. Obviously expressing its own concerns as well as sympathy for the French position, it asserted that "a further increase in the Bundeswehr potential . . . would not be to the liking of France or any other European member of NATO."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 19 -

It went on to suggest, however, that France should not allow itself to be dissuaded by these considerations from contributing its share to the cause of European security and disarmament. It broadly implied that French objections to participation were based in part on a false premise--that the conditions governing force reductions would be those heretofore set forth in NATO documents. The future conference, it asserted, "will have little in common" with this concept, and its results "will not harm the security interests of any side."

OFFSETTING

FORCE REDUCTIONS

Going on to discuss the military reasons for France's participation in the talks, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI noted France's objections to the "asymmetrical" force reduction schemes advanced by NATO. Praising the French attitude, the paper referred to studies being undertaken in France regarding alternative methods for bringing about force cuts. It drew particular attention to a model that would focus on "offensive-defensive types of weapons," saying the Quai d'Orsay regarded this model as among the "most logical." Apparently implying its own interest in the idea, it went on to explain how the model would work: Warsaw Pact tanks, it said, could be balanced off against NATO antitank weapons, and proportional reductions could be arranged accordingly.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 20 -

U S S R

POLITICAL ECONOMISTS RESIST PRESSURES FOR REFORM

Despite a December 1971 Central Committee decree criticizing the Institute of Economics for concentrating on abstract doctrinal matters rather than on practical economic concerns, the predominantly conservative school of political economists has continued to resist pressure to reform its ways. Since the adoption of the decree, the conservatives have opposed attempts to revise the training of political economists to include modern economic concepts and methods. At the same time, a recent PRAVDA article, apparently reflecting official impatience, attacked several political economists by name for obstructing the application of modern methods in the Soviet economy.

The recalcitrant attitude toward innovation prevailing among political economists was displayed at a recent Moscow State University conference on training instructors in this field, reported in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 27 May. According to the report, by liberal economist Gennadiy Lisichkin, proposals were made at the conference to broaden the educational curriculum to include instruction in computers, mathematics, and production technology in addition to the traditional doctrinal courses. However, Leningrad State University dean V.A. Peshekhonov objected to the proposals on grounds that they would distract students from study of "Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the regularities of economic development." In a similar earlier attempt to alter the dogmatic orientation of training, reported by Yugoslav reporter Risto Bajalski in the 10 April Yugoslav paper POLITIKA, a prominent textbook on political economy was attacked for containing ultraconservative formulations contrary to the regime's economic reform. The text's author, Nikolay Tsagolov, head of Moscow State University's political economy department, responded by attacking its critics as sympathetic to "market socialism" and by refusing to alter his book.

The continued sniping by conservatives at modern economic methods prompted a 4 June PRAVDA article by I. Solovyev. Citing Brezhnev's endorsement of mathematical-economic models, systems analysis, and other modern methods, Solovyev assailed articles by Yuriy Belik for opposing new methods of planning, by Yakov Kronrod for endeavoring to discredit modern methods of systems analysis, and by Adolf Kats for attacking the works of leading Soviet mathematical

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 21 -

economists. Although the PRAVDA article fell short of offering a blanket endorsement of the diverse contributions of the new economics, it served as a warning to political economists that the methods of ideological abuse and character assassination employed in past disputes were no longer suited to the times.

ECONOMISTS RESUME DEBATE OVER FUTURE OF KOLKHOZ SYSTEM

Although the idea of converting kolkhozes into sovkhoses was vigorously repudiated after Khrushchev's fall, the initiation of work on a long-range plan for 1976-1990 has reopened the dispute over the future of the kolkhoz system. The controversy erupted last December at one of a series of meetings conducted by the Institute of Economics as part of its contribution to the long-range plan. The debate at the December meeting arose over an article prepared for publication in QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS by Yakov Kronrod, head of the institute's sector for general problems of the political economy of socialism. The article, which later appeared in the February issue of the journal, argued that kolkhozes were incompatible with socialism and would be taken over by the state even before the advent of communism.

Although the deputy director of the institute, Viktor Cherkovets, agreed with Kronrod, the head of its economic history sector, Ivan Gladkov, took strong exception to Kronrod's assertion that the kolkhozes are "not an obligatory element of the socialist system" and should be terminated. Gladkov continued the debate in the April QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, upholding the socialist credentials of kolkhozes and complaining that Kronrod's thesis simply amounted to "turning kolkhozes into sovkhoses." "The task for the future," he argued, "is to strengthen the kolkhoz system in every way."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 22 -

RED STAR'S NEW THEORETICAL SERIES TAKES IDEOLOGICAL TURN

The second installment of RED STAR's new series on military theoretical questions has brought into sharper focus the issue of party-military relations tentatively raised by Lt. Gen. I. Zavyalov in the first article on 17 April.* Without directly contesting the claim advanced by Zavyalov, that the military's co-authorship of military doctrine gives it a strong influence in the formulation of military policy, the second article conveys a sharply different impression of the dynamics of the party-military relationship in this sphere. It implies that the party, through its correct interpretation and application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, informs and guides all creative intellectual activities in the Soviet Union, including military thought. Published on 17 May, the article is authored by Maj. Gen. A. Milovidov, a long-time faculty member of the Lenin Military-Political Academy.

The issue at the heart of Milovidov's article is the question of the autonomy of military thought. The Soviet military has consistently claimed extensive rights in this regard, apparently acting on the belief that a certain independence from party interference is a necessary condition both for the effective performance of its institutional functions and for the successful assertion of its interests in the policymaking process. Accordingly, it has cultivated the notion that military affairs fall under a special discipline of thought, military science, and that the findings of this science are a necessary ingredient in the formulation of military policy.

Soviet military spokesmen have advanced this view repeatedly. Perhaps the best known exposition of the viewpoint was the late Marshal Zakharov's 4 February 1965 article in RED STAR attacking Khrushchev for his "subjectivism" and "hare-brained" scheming. Zakharov reserved his strongest indignation for Khrushchev's practice of rejecting the advice of military professionals--a practice which disregarded the fact, the marshal emphasized, that this advice was "based on a profound study of military affairs and the laws of armed conflict."

* Zavyalov's article is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 May 1973, pages 2-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 23 -

While Milovidov's article avoids any direct challenge of this military viewpoint and specifically disavows any intention of raising one, it does so indirectly by attacking historical views easily identifiable with traditional military biases. Purporting to see in the history of Soviet military thought recurrent instances of an overly narrow, technical approach to the analysis of war, Milovidov contrasts this approach with the one assertedly upheld by the party--a broad philosophical approach, in which war is viewed not simply as the art of armed conflict but as a social and political phenomenon. He implies that it was only due to timely interventions by the party that Soviet military thought was saved from serious methodological errors.

Milovidov refers in this connection to an unidentified "discussion," clearly the 1965-66 debate involving Talenskiy, Rybkin, and Grudinin over the question of whether the destructiveness of nuclear weapons repealed the Leninist axiom that war is an extension of policy.* Criticizing the affirmative position that had been taken on this issue--by Rybkin, among others--Milovidov asserts that it stemmed from a tendency to "absolutize" the technical aspects of war. He goes on to suggest that this was the same tendency that had led Trotsky and his adherents to define the military profession as the "trade of war."

By placing his argument in the context of these historical errors, Milovidov clearly raises a signal of polemical intent. Yet he refrains from extending his criticisms beyond the historical incidents mentioned, in keeping with his disavowal of any intention of challenging the military position on the autonomy of military thought. Indeed, he goes so far as to acknowledge that "military science has its own inner logic." A final assessment of Milovidov's intent can only be given by his colleagues, and subsequent articles in the series may shed some light on their verdict. In the meantime, it can be said that Milovidov has redressed the military bias introduced into the new RED STAR series by Zavyalov by balancing it with a strong assertion of the party's guiding role in military thought.

*For an analysis of this debate, see the FBIS SURVEY for 4 August 1966, pages 33-36.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS WRENDS

13 JUNE 1973

- 24 -

CHINA

COLLEGE ENROLLMENT UNDERWAY, SCHOOLS TIGHTEN STANDARDS

College enrollment for the autumn term finally seems well underway with Fukien, Liaoning, and Kiangsi joining Hunan and Kwangsi in announcing that the enrollment program is in progress. Most qualifications for students are similar to those adopted last year, when Kwangsi, for example, noted that 70 percent of those admitted met senior middle school graduate standards and that policies had been adopted to enroll a certain number of women, minority groups, and children of nonworking people. The broadcasts this year all specify that students to be enrolled must have at least the equivalent of a junior middle school cultural level, be about 20 years old, be unmarried and in good health, and have at least two years of practical experience. These students will obviously be drawn from recent graduates with good school and political records.

The Kiangsi announcement on 10 June, however, differentiated these students from the workers, peasants, and revolutionary cadres to be admitted, detailing how the schools may meet problems caused by bringing in students with low cultural levels. Like some schemes aired in previous years, the Kiangsi plan calls for segregating unqualified worker-students into special "preparatory" classes instead of mixing them in with the educated youths. Thus the Maoist ideal of open education is squared with the need for better substantive college training. The workers will not be required to meet standards required of regular students. Admissions will be "as flexible as possible," though workers must have at least eight years of practical experience. A "small number" of workers will be admitted to general courses, but for them there is an age limit of 30 and their college study must be arranged so that they can "apply what they have studied after graduation."

Unlike in previous stages of educational reform, the Kiangsi plan explicitly provides authority for removing unsuccessful students "if within three months after admission a student is found to be lacking proper qualifications or to have violated the enrollment procedures." The plan also offers considerable discretion to the schools. Each student admitted must pass a written admissions examination given by the school even though he must have already been examined and approved by party committees at the regional and municipal levels.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 25 -

The Kiangsi enrollment plan takes note of the problems produced by the need to allow for admission of a representative number of students sent down to the countryside. While each county is to be considered a unit for testing and selection, with applicants selected in general according to county quotas, the broadcast specifies that "more students should be selected from the areas where large numbers of educated young people are concentrated."

The current guidelines, especially the detailed account offered by Kiangsi, indicate that PRC educational authorities are making serious efforts to deal with complaints over policies devised during the cultural revolution. All cultural revolution effects have not been removed, however; approval of the masses, two years of labor, and a good political record are still prerequisites for any student seeking admission. The only consolation offered those who do not meet requirements are that they "happily remain at their own posts" where they can also make contributions.

PRC MEDIA NOTE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS, URGE GREATER EFFORTS

Recent broadcasts have expressed concern about harvest prospects in view of a second straight year of poor weather, but there are no signs that a change in China's current moderate agricultural policies is contemplated. All economic sectors have been advised to give first priority to rapid development of agriculture. A Canton broadcast of a 10 June SOUTHERN DAILY editorial warned that funds must not be diverted from agriculture and that industry must concentrate on things which produce "rapid results" in agriculture this year when "the weather in Kwangtung is abnormal and the flood season arrived early." Industry was told to save on electricity in order to insure power for draining land, and factories were told to organize emergency teams of mechanics for the crash repair of farm machinery. While broadcasts earlier this spring suggested that some small fertilizer plants might be closed because of their excessive use of coal, the editorial stated that "coal, electricity, and material" for the plants must be assured. In stressing agriculture the editorial made the rare admission that "for a certain time less material and finance might be available for developing heavy industry," though in the long run its development will be "more rapid."

There is evidence of sensitivity about publicizing the adverse natural conditions endangering this year's harvest. NCNA on 30 May went so far as to halt publication of a report it had disseminated which called the drought in Hopei "even more serious than the one last year," replacing it with an article on 1 June removing that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

13 JUNE 1973

- 26 -

Judgment while stressing the hard work being done to overcome natural disasters. An Anhwei broadcast on 10 June tried to put an optimistic gloss on the situation, stating that "in various localities" output of rapeseed and summer grain is greater than last year. In general the provincial media have warned against over optimism while encouraging the peasants with exhortations that hard work can overcome natural disasters. A Chekiang broadcast on 7 June linked a forecast of "excessive rains in June" with a call to increase efforts on "the dangerously threatened projects" so that they will withstand the flooding safely. A HUNAN DAILY editorial on 9 June stated that early crops are "growing comparatively well," but warned that rain and floods in some areas coupled with pests and plant diseases have introduced "certain unfavorable factors." The editorial, like a few others earlier, warned also against "sabotage by the class enemies."

While flooding seems to be a problem in southern China and drought serious in the north, a turn in the weather could still result in a relatively good crop. Last year's crop shortfall and the gloomy prospects this year have not convinced the Chinese leadership that any radical change in agricultural policy is needed. Most cadres are probably quite conscious of the difference between the relatively mild difficulties resulting from the current period of bad weather during a period of economic moderation and the anguish of the Great Leap when weather problems were exacerbated by radical agricultural experimentation. A 9 June Hupeh broadcast even suggested that more retreats from the old commune ideal will be allowed those production teams that desire them. The broadcast praised a production team which as part of its policy of awarding remuneration according to labor had split up the labor force into six work groups. Individual work points are assessed not by the larger team but by the small work groups according to the quality and quantity of work done, thus bringing individual initiative even more in line with wages paid.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 27 -

NOTES

PRAGUE CEMA SESSION: The final communique on the 27th CEMA session in Prague, held 5-8 June, stopped short of a direct call for organizational ties between CEMA and the Common Market, issuing instead a general appeal for expanded economic relations among European countries on the basis of "the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence." Brezhnev had been explicit on the desirability of cooperation between the two economic groupings in his major speeches of 20 March and 21 December 1972. The Prague gathering ratified the 16 May 1973 cooperation agreement between CEMA and Finland as 2 prototype for economic cooperation between states with differing social systems, based on "equality and noninterference." As at the 26th CEMA meeting in Moscow last July, the main preoccupation at Prague was with implementation of the long-range CEMA integration program adopted two years ago in Bucharest.

The Soviet and East European representation at the Prague gathering, as at last year's Moscow meeting, was at the heads-of-government level except for the GDR's First Deputy Premier Sindermann; Premier Stoph was absent for reasons of health, according to TANJUG. Cuba, accepted to CEMA membership last July, was represented by Deputy Premier Rodriguez; Yugoslavia, represented in July by Premier Bijedic, sent only a deputy premier this time. The DRV and DPRK ambassadors to the CSSR both attended the session as observers, where only the DPRK sent an observer to last year's meeting.

SCHLESINGER SPEECH: Available comment from Moscow and its East European allies on Defense Secretary-designate Schlesinger's 7 June speech in Brussels all but ignored its estimative content --the remarks which, according to Western press accounts, sharply downgraded NATO estimates of the threat currently posed by the Warsaw Pact. The thrust of the sparse, routine commentary has been that the speech revealed "contradictions" between the European countries' interests and U.S. demands for greater West European sharing of the burden on the U.S. balance of payments. A Prague radio commentary on the 10th declared that Schlesinger "quite brutally" demanded that West European member states increase their contributions toward the maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe.

Moscow ignored the speech entirely in most of its initial radio and press reports on the NATO meeting, and the sole Moscow comment on Schlesinger's remarks appeared in a radio "military-political

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 28 -

commentary," broadcast in German on the 8th. Concentrating on the issue of burden-sharing, this commentary also referred to a still-unfinished Defense Department study on NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities described in detail by Michael Getler in the Washington POST on the 7th. Without specifically mentioning Getler's article, the commentator said the study questioned the "reasonableness" of many U.S. military concepts and doctrines regarding deterrence policy. In a possible allusion to the substance of Schlesinger's remarks, it added that the results of the Pentagon study challenged the "official line of the West European hierarchy of NATO" on defense policy. A similar observation appeared in a Budapest radio commentary on the 10th which said U.S. and West European views on European security clashed at Brussels, with the former believing "on the basis of secret and not so secret data and reports," that the forces of both East and West can be reduced in central Europe.

RADIO FREE EUROPE FUNDING: There has been limited East European reaction--but no monitored Soviet reference--to the 7 May Presidential statement endorsing the recommendations of the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting (the Eisenhower commission), which concluded that U.S. funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should continue. Czechoslovak and Bulgarian media have strongly criticized the Administration's decision to ask Congress for additional funding to extend the life of the two "ideological" radios. While noting that the commission's recommendations allow for a possible termination of the radios' activities if future political conditions are suitable, Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 9 May asserted that the "clear" issue was one of continued "ideological subversion" efforts against the USSR and the other socialist states. Bratislava's PRAVDA on 11 May described the output of the radio as interference in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries. Echoing a theme of past East European comment on RFE and Radio Liberty, Prague radio on 25 May urged the FRG to remove from its territory the radio stations which "propagate opinions alien to the strivings of the West German Government." The comment observed that Congress will not necessarily approve the Administration's recommendations.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 JUNE 1973

Moscow (2852 items)

CEMA Meetings in Prague	(--)	7%
China	(9%)	7%
PRG 4th Anniversary	(--)	6%
Middle East	(2%)	5%
Soviet Local Elections,	(4%)	4%
17 June		
Brezhnev Visits to West	(13%)	7%
TU-144 Crash at Paris	(--)	3%
Air Show		

Peking (1363 items)

Vietnam	(5%)	47%
[DRV Leaders in PRC	(3%)	27%
[PRG 4th Anniversary	(--)	12%
Domestic Issues	(48%)	29%
Cambodia	(11%)	6%
[Sihanouk Tour of	(4%)	4%
Africa, Europe		
PRC Foreign Minister in UK	(--)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.